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TAKING THE RELIGION OUT OF
RELIGIOUS PROPERTY DISPUTES
Abstract: The current trend of local parish suppressions raises fundamen-
tal questions regarding ownership of gifted property. Disputes regarding
ownership arises when a donor's intent conflicts with the institution's
hierarchy claiming ownership of the gifted property. Hierarchical religious
institutions like the Roman Catholic Church can assert such claims under
two legal principles. First, because the First Amendment requires the
separation of church and state, civil courts cannot interpret religious law.
Second, because hierarchical religious institutions are often organized as
Corporations sole, local parishes are agents of the archdiocese. This Note
argues for extending neutral principles of law currently used to settle
antra-church property disputes to property disputes between religious
institutions and individuals. In applying neutral principles of law, includ-
ing the law of wills and trusts, courts can successfully adjudicate property
disputes to ensure a testator's intent is effectuated.
INTRODUCTION
The suppression, or closing, of local parishes as part of a hierar-
chical church system presents complex problems for the disposition
of church property.' Because hierarchical churches, like the Roman
Catholic Church, are often organized as corporations sole, property
that belongs to the local parish may also belong to the higher church
body.2 Parishioners who set aside assets for the exclusive use by their
local parish in wills or charitable trusts may be surprised to find out
that upon the suppression of their local parish, the archdiocese often
has title to the property: 3
In these situations, a fundamental tension exists between the dis-
position of church property and the actual intent of the donor, 4 For the
most part, these issues are not justiciable by civil courts because the
See WILLIAM W. IlAssio-r, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 1:17 (2003).
Suppression is the closing of a particular local parish. St. Matthew's Slovak Roman Catho-
lic Congregation v. Most Revered Wuerl, 106 F, App'x 761, 763 (3d Cir, 2004).
2 See BAssra-r, supra note 1, § 1:17.
See Akottry v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 271, 272
(Mass. Super. 2004),
4
 Sec Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 441-42 (1970).
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First Amendment requires the separation of church and state. 6 De-
pending upon the ecclesiastical framework of hierarchical churches,
however, it is sometimes possible for civil courts to sever secular prop-
erty disputes from religious doctrine and successfully apply neutral
principles of law to dispose of the property. 6
This Note argues for the extension of the neutral principle ap-
proach from the context of intra-church disputes to disputes arising
between religious institutions and individuals, and suggests how donors
can protect their gifted property from transferring to the archdiocese.
Part I of this Note provides a synopsis of the concepts and practical im-
plications of hierarchical religious institutions organized as corpora-
tions sole.? Part II of this Note explains the First Amendment hurdle
that plaintiffs must clear in order to adjudicate this kind of property
dispute. 8 Part III of this Note explores the concepts of severability, neu-
tral principles of law, and specific examples of such secular principles. 9
Part IV of this Note endorses the extension of the neutral principle ap-
proach to property disputes between churches and individual donors
and suggests how best to express one's intent so as to prevent an arch-
diocese from becoming an unintended beneficiary."
I. THE CORPORATION SOLE AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
The corporate structure known as the corporation sole often
shields religious institutions from civil court interference in property
disputes." A corporation is an artificial person existing as an entity
distinct from that of its members. 12 The corporation is a legal entity
created via state law designed to shield its individual members from
liability while also providing a legally responsible voice for all who
deal through and with the corporation." A corporation can hold title
to property, sue, and be sued in its own name." By creating a separate
corporate structure for religious organizations, individual members
can avoid personal liability."
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6 SeeJones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,603 (1979); BAssrt .r, supra note 1, § 3:6.
7 See infra notes 11-40 and accompanying text.
a See infra notes 41-88 and accompanying text.
u See infra notes 89-170 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 171-223 and accompanying text.
11 See BASSEIT, supra note 1, § 1:17.
12 See id. § 3:1.
" See id.
14 See id.
is See id.
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Religious organizations can create two types of corporations: ag-
gregate and sole. 16 Corporations aggregate are characterized by mul-
tiple people united in form—people who occupy the same office at
different times—who are part of a perpetual succession of members
that can continue indefinitely." In contrast, corporations sole consist
only of one person and that person's successors who are incorporated
by law to give them certain legal capacities and advantages, particu-
larly perpentity. 18 Examples of corporations sole include kings, bish-
ops, parsons, and vicars.19 Through the corporation sole, the present
incumbent and subsequent predecessors are theoretically one and the
same, because anything given to one is also given to the others."
The modern corporation sole emerged from English common
law. 21 At that time, the crown, bishopric and vicarage, by operation of
law, were considered continuing and independent entities that held
and administered property through a vertical succession of office
holders.22 Vertical succession allowed office holders to hold property
for the duration of their time in office and to hold it for the benefit of
and until replaced by their successor. 23 Today about one-third of the
Roman Catholic diocesan bishops in the United States are corpora-
tions sole. 24 Episcopal dioceses, various Orthodox dioceses, and the
bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints are also or-
ganized as corporations sole. 25
Corporations sole are creations of state law and must be estab-
lished by charter or religious incorporation acts. 26 Legislative action is
required because corporations sole cannot arise by operation of law
because the First Amendment, as applied to the states by incorpora-
tion through the Fourteenth Amendment, requires church disestab-
16 SCC ROPERT S. STEVENS & HARRY C. HENN, STATUTES, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON
'I'llE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OT/I ER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 8 (1965).
17 See id.
38 See id.
19 See id.
ScC id. at 8-9.
21 See IlAssErr, supra note 1, § 1:17 (citing HOWARD LEONER OLECK, NONPROFIT COR-
PORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATIONS 33 (5th ed. 1988)).
22 see id.
22 See id.
24 See id. (citing James B. O'Hara, The Modern Corporation Sole, 93 DICK. L. REV. 23, 24
n.11 (1988) ).
25 See id.
26 Sec id. The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Washington, D.C., is the only federally
incorporated corporation sole, and was created by a special act of Congress in 1998. lins-
sE•r, supra note 1, § 1:17.
1072	 Boston College Law Review
	 [Vol. 46;1069
lishment.27
 Seventeen states have statutes that explicitly recognize the
corporation sole. 28
 At least eight other jurisdictions have utilized a
special charter to create one or more corporations sole. 29
Exceptions to the general rule—that corporations sole no longer
arise by implication of law and must be created by state law—exist in
(1) Florida, where the state supreme court held that the common law
corporation sole is still valid; (2) Arkansas, where the state supreme
court held that without. a special legislative act, the Roman Catholic
Bishop of Little Rock is recognized as a corporation sole; and (3)
Delaware, where the Roman Catholic Diocese of Wilmington is a one-
person corporation tinder the state's General Corporation Law in-
stead of a corporation sole incorporated under the Delaware Code for
Religious Societies and Corporation
A corporation sole provides a simple and efficient method of
centralized control.31 Moreover, and more importantly, disputes re-
garding the use and ownership of property as well as civil accountabil-
ity for church assets are usually nonjusticiable issues for civil courts. 32
Thus, a corporation sole protects churches from use and ownership
disputes because these disputes often cannot be resolved by civil
courts." The ability to remove church property disputes from a civil
court's jurisdiction is the major reason why many states do not allow
the creation of corporations sole and prefer to provide for a trustee or
membership corporation for religious organizations. 34 Under a cor-
27 See U.S. CONST, amends. I, XIV; Wright v. Morgan, 191 U.S. 55, 59 (1903). In 1903,
in Wright v. Morgan, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that the law does not recognize the
bishop as a corporation sole unless incorporated as such by statute. I& Disestablishment of
religion is the separation of church and state which prevents religious institutions from
establishing their beliefs as law and from receiving financial support from the state. See
linssri -r, supra note 1, § 2:1.
28 See Al.A. CODE §§ 10-4-1 to -9; ALASKA STAT. § 10-40.060; Atttz. REV. S7'X1'. ANN. §§ 10-
421 to -426; CAI,. CORP. CODE §§ 10000-10015; Coto. REV. STAT. §§ 7-52-101 to -104; HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 419-1 to -9; Immo ConE § 30-304; Mtctt. Contr. Laws §§ 458.1,2, 458.271-
.273; Mown CODE ANN. §§ 35-3-101 to -209; Nix. REV. STAT. §§ 84.010—.080; N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 306.6—.8; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 615; O.R. REV. STAT. § 65.067; S.C. ConE ANN.
§ 33-31-140; UTAtt CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-1 to -12; WASH. REV. ConE §§ 24.12.010—.040; Wyo.
STAT. §§ 17-8-109 to -113; BASSETT, supra note 1, § 1:17.
28 See BAssErr, supra note 1, § 1:17. Those jurisdictions include the District of Colum-
bia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Rhode Island. See
id.
30 See 8 DEL. CODE ANN. § 101; Little Rock v. Linn, 432 S.W.2d 455, 462 (Ark. 1968);
Hurley v. Werly, 203 So. 2d 530, 532 (Fla. 1967).
21 See BAssETT, supra note 1, § 1:17.
22 See id.
23 See id.
34 See id.
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poration sole, church members must rely almost exclusively upon in-
ternal canons and church bylaws for accountability and recourse re-
garding resolution of property disputes with the church." Relying on
religious documents containing these canons and bylaws often re-
quires interpretation of canon law, something a civil court. cannot do,
thus removing the majority of church disputes from civil courts."
In addition to the distinction between corporations sole and ag-
gregate, churches can also be incorporated according to different
structural frameworks. 37 Congregational churches are self-governed
and are described as independent entities without obligation to a
higher authority." Unlike churches that are congregational in struc-
ture and based on the will of the majority, hierarchical churches place
the final decision-making authority in the ecclesiastical body that. is
superior to the local congregation." Local parishes are subordinate to
the higher church unit and to the church tribunal, which retains ul-
timate authority and decision-making capabilities.° It is this hierar-
chical structure—in which a higher church unit may retain decision-
making authority over the local church unit,---that is the source of
tension when a parish is suppressed and ownership of church prop-
erty is called into question.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PROPERTY DISPUTES
In addition to relying on corporate structures, religious institutions
can also insulate or protect their assets by creating and documenting
the appropriate "church polity."41 Church polity describes the inner
workings and organizational framework of religious entities, their
methods of governance, and the manner in which churches implement
their doctrines and religious commitments. 42
 Church polity determines
the relationship between local churches and the national denomina-
tion. 43 Because church polity is usually ecclesiastical in nature, it is of-
33 Sec id.
SecJones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979); IlAssErr, supra note 1, § 1:17.
37 See linssErr, supra note 1, § 3.3.
" See id.
33 Sec Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 682 (1872); IlAssErr, supra note 1, § 3:3.
40 Sec Watson, 80 U.S. at 682; lInssErr, supm note 1, § 3:3. This Note uses the terms lo-
cal parish" and 'higher church unit" in a broad sense as opposed to specifically naming
the organization of a single religion because this subject matter is applicable to numerous
hierarchical religious institutions.
41 See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603-04 (1979).
43 See linssErr, supra note 1, § 3:2.
43 See id.
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ten not subject to judicial determination." For this reason judicial de-
termination of an ecclesiastical dispute would violate the First Amend-
men L 45
Religious protections provided by the First Amendment, as incor-
porated through the Fourteenth Amendment to be applicable to the
states, present the initial obstacle that plaintiffs must overcome when
seeking to adjudicate church property disputes." The First Amend-
ment not only protects individuals from the federal government's in-
trusion into religious doctrines, but also serves to protect the liberty of
churches and religious organizations. 47 The First Amendment forbids
Congress from enacting any law respecting the establishment of relig-
ion and from prohibiting the free exercise of religion."
The First Amendment's Establishment Clause guarantees indi-
viduals that the federal government will not use its resources to im-
pose or advance religion.49 Additionally, the Free Exercise Clause
guarantees that the federal government will not interfere with an in-
dividual's right to pursue religious beliefs of their choosing." These
prohibitions are designed to limit the federal government's influence
over an individual's religious beliefs and its oversight of religious insti-
tutions.51 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, distinguishes between
the absolute freedom of religious beliefs and the limited freedom to
act upon those beliefs. 52 Religious organizations cannot use the First
Amendment to shield themselves from civil liability when disputed
conduct falls outside the scope of religious beliefs and doctrine, 53
The activities of religious corporations are governed by their own
internal laws. 54
 Because the religious corporations are creations of the
state, canon law is necessarily and indirectly enforced in civil courts to
the extent that such issues overlap with non-religious issues. 55 Leading
Supreme Court decisions hold that when issues arise regarding inter-
44
 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602; HAssrer, supra note 1, § 3:2.
45 SceJones, 443 U.S. at 602.
46 Sec id.
47 See U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV;faties, 443 U.S. at 603-04.
48 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I; see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,303 (1940).
49 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I, ci. 1; Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303; BAssrer, supra note 1,
§ 7:20.
" See U.S. CoNsr. amend. I, cl. 1; Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303; BAssrrr, supra note 1,
§ 7:20.
51 See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303; BASSVIT, supra note 1. § 2:1.
52 See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303 .
See Jones, 443 U.S. at 605; IlAssurr, supra note 1, § 7:20.
54 Sceptres, 443 U.S. at 603; BASSE1T, supra note 1, § 3:6.
55 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602; liAssrt -r, supra note 1, § 3:6.
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nal canon law, organizational discipline of churches, or resolution of
property disputes within churches, civil courts must defer to the
judgments of the religious corporation's own canon laws and regula-
tions. 56 When ecclesiastical controls are absent or do not clearly re-
solve the matter in dispute, however, secular courts are empowered to
intervene with the application of neutral principles of civil law. 57
Neutral principles of law allow courts to apply secular legal theo-
ries, such as property or contract law, to disputes involving religious
organizations without violating the First Amendment. 55 Civil courts
are an appropriate forum for resolving church property disputes
when neutral principles of law can be applied.59 The reason for this is
that when ecclesiastical issues are not at stake, neither the Establish-
ment Clause nor the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. is
violated by government resolution of these disputes. 6° Because no
constitutional barrier is present for state action in these situations,
states may resolve disputes over church property through state courts
by using neutral principles of law and need not adopt rules of com-
pulsory deference to religious authorities in resolving such disputes.° 1
Thus, there is a clear distinction between disputes involving the
internal structure and organization of a church—over which civil
courts have no jurisdiction—and disputes involving the disposition of
property that belongs to a religious institution—over which civil
courts do have jurisdiction because resolution is achieved through
secular laws of property, trust, and contract. 62
In 1872, Watson v. Jones was the U.S. Supreme Court's first case
regarding a dispute over church property.65 Although the schism that
triggered the dispute was a result of opposing views on slavery and
began as an internal theological debate over morals, the involved
church factions each claimed entitlement to use of the church." The
56 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-04 ; Watson v.iones, 80 U.S. 679, 729-31, 733 (1872). Wat-
son and Jones created the key concepts of judicial deference to ecclesiastical authority
within hierarchical religions structures and severability of secular legal issues from religion
without violating the First Amendment so that civil courts can adjudicate church property
disputes. SeeJones, 443 U.S. at 603-04; Watson, 80 U.S. at 729-31, 733; BAssrt -r, supra note
1, § 3:6.
57 See Watson, 80 U.S. at 602; BASSEVI ., supra note 1, § 3:6.
58 SeeJones, 80 U.S. at 603.
59 See id. at 602; linssri-r, supra note 1, § 7:18.
69 See Jones, 80 U.S. at 602; BASS•IT, supra note 1, § 7:18.
61 See Jones, 80 U.S. at 604-05.
62 SCCJOT/C.S, 80 U.S. at 602-03; IlAssErr, supra note 1, § 7:18.
69 See Watson, 80 U.S. at 705.
64 See id. at 692.
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Supreme Court ultimately decided that it could not determine which
of the two factions actually represented the church and therefore con-
trolled the property.°
The reason for this decision was twofold. 66 First, the Court ex-
plained that those who belong to a church implicitly consent to the
church's superior organization's ability to make their own determina-
tions without interference from civil courts. 67 Second, the Court held
that this was not a case where the disputed property was devised by a
specific individual who wanted to retain control, but rather the prop-
erty was purchased by the church for the congregation, so long as the
congregation remained part of the church. 68
 The Court's decision to
allow the church tribunal to determine the rightful congregation rep-
resents the historical practice of compulsory deference to religious
institutions.69 Compulsory deference was advocated because of the
seeming inability to adjudicate religious institutions' property issues
without violating constitutional protections."
In 1979, however, the Supreme Court established the current
standard of civil justiciability in Jones v. Wolf in which it declared civil
courts competent in adjudicating any issue capable of analysis under
neutral principles of law so long as it does not require a judgment re-
garding matters of theology or religious belief." Like Watson, Jones
also involved a dispute over church property resulting from a schism
in a local church that was part of a hierarchical church organization. 72
In Jones, more than half of the congregation voted to separate from
the larger church government and unite with another denomina-
tion. 73
 After the superior church body formed a commission to inves-
tigate the schism within the local church, it issued a ruling that the
minority faction—which opposed the break—was the true congrega-
tion. 74 The conflict over property ownership surfaced when the supe-
rior church body withdrew authority from the majority faction. 75 Ul-
timately, the current standard for resolving controversies about the
65 Id. at 727.
66 Id. at 726, 729.
67 Id. at 729.
66 Watson, 80 U.S. at 726.
66 Id. at 727.
76 Id.
71 Sceptics, 443 U.S. at 603-05: BAssrxr, supra note 1, § 7:22.
72 Jones, 443 U.S. at 598.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See id. at 598-99.
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ownership of church assets simply requires a determination of who is
the legal owner of the property in question:7s
This current standard replaced the previous standard of compul-
sory deference to church bodies as seen in Watson. 77 The earlier prac-
tice of compulsory deference was based on the notion that because a
religious institution was involved in a property dispute, the dispute
was inherently religious in nature and therefore nonjusticiable by civil
courts. 78 The modern standard represents the revised understanding
that church property disputes can be settled with neutral principles of
law.79
In 2004, in Akoury v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, a Massa-
chusetts Superior Court contributed to the conCept of neutral princi-
ples of law.s° The Akoury decision specifies that the application of neu-
tral principles of law will be most applicable in those cases where
plaintiffs can show a strong property interests' The court concluded
that the plaintiffs' challenge regarding ownership of church property
was a pretext for a challenge against the Archbishop's decision to sup-
press a local parish. 82 The court determined that the decision to sup-
press a parish is inherently an ecclesiastical decision and therefore non-
justiciable by civil courts.ss The court reasoned that when the plaintiff
has a strong property interest, the court will more likely address the
underlying property dispute and less likely claim the dispute involves
nonjusticiable issues. 84 Thus, Akoury adds to the foundation of neutral
principles in two ways. 85 First, it highlights that the way an argument is
framed is key to whether a court will adjudicate the issue.ss For exam-
ple, in this case the court determined that the plaintiffs argument
sounded less like a property dispute and more like a challenge against
parish suppression.87
 Second, it indicates that the extent of the plain-
78 Sec id. at 610; IlAssryr, supra note 1, § 7:22.
77 Seefones. 443 U.S. at 605; Watson, 80 U.S. at 727.
See tones, 443 U.S. at 604; 11 1(z:son, 80 U.S. at 706.
79 See tones, 443 U.S. at 603.
89 See generally Akoury V. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. 271
(lass. Super. 2004).
81 See id, at 272. In Akoury, the plaintiffs were claiming title to the church grounds, the
church, furniture, religious items, and $200,000 held in the parish accounts donated by
the parish members. Id. at 271.
82 See id. at 272.
83 See id.
84 See id.
8$ Sec Maury, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. at 272.
88 See id. at 271-72.
87 See id. at 272.
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tiff's property interest also affects the court's decision of whether to
adjudicate the issue—the stronger the plaintiff's claim to the property,
the more likely the court will solve the dispute."
III. SECULAR PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO PROPERTY DISPUTES
A. Deference, Neutral Principles of Law, and Severability
When it comes to the resolution of church disputes, civil courts
have developed two basic approaches." The first approach requires
the court to adhere to the notion of judicial deference whereby it pro-
tects and implements the decision reached by the church-designated
ecclesiastical tribunal." The second approach involves the court ad-
judicating the given property dispute by applying a secular, that is,
religiously neutral, analysis. 9 '
Courts followed the compulsory deference approach as spelled
out by the Supreme Court in 1872 in Watson v. Jones for over one hun-
dred years." At issue in Watson, was whether the governing body of the
Presbyterian Church had the power to prescribe qualifications for lo-
cal church offices and determine which faction of a local church was
entitled to the church property in dispute." The Supreme Court in
Watson held that the governing body of the church had such power,
thereby creating the doctrine of judicial deference to the internal de-
cision-making body of a church. 94
The Supreme Court indicated that the rule of judicial deference
prevented the entanglement of church and state by providing relig-
ious institutions with the power to decide questions of religious belief,
church discipline, and ecclesiastical government without state inter-
ference.95
 Additionally', whenever questions of faith and custom had
been determined by the ecclesiastical tribunal, civil courts had to ac-
cept the decisions as final and binding upon them.96
 The rule of def-
erence requires courts to defer to the internal decisions of church
58 See id.
89
 SeaJones v. Wolf. 443 U.S. 595, 604-05 (1979); IlAssrt -r, supra note 1, § 7:23.
99
 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 604; BAssErr, supra note 1, § 7:23.
91
 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 604; BAssrm supra note 1, § 7:23.
92 See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S, 679, 706 (1872); BASSET.., supra note I, § 7:23.
93 See Watson, 80 U.S. at 717; Bassurr, supra note 1, § 7:23.
54
 See Watson, 80 U.S. at 706; BASSET.., supra note 1, § 7:23.
95 See Watson, 80 U.S. at 733; BAss rm., supra note 1, § 7:23.
96
 See Watson, 80 U.S. at 733; BASSETT, supra note 1, § 7:23.
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authorities when such decisions are exclusively linked to the funda-
mental beliefs and interpretation of church law.° 7
This deferential approach by courts changed, however, when, in
1979, the Supreme Court adopted the neutral principles of law ap-
proach in Jones v. Wolp8 In Jones, the Court held that states may adopt
such neutral principles in adjudicating the resolution of church prop-
erty disputes without violating constitutional safeguards." The Court
indicated, however, that in order for states to comply with the First
Amendment's religious clauses, civil courts must defer to ecclesiastical
tribunals—if they exist—concerning matters of religious doctrine and
polity. 100
Courts need not, however, follow a rule of compulsory deference
to ecclesiastical authorities in resolving church property disputes
where there is an absence of religious doctrine or polity concerning
the issue in dispute. 101 Where no doctrinal controversy is involved,
civil courts are entitled to follow neutral principles of law to interpret
relevant provisions of a religious organization's governing docu-
ments—such as deeds, church constitutions, bylaws, and contracts—
under current state law.'"
The neutral principles of law approach benefits those challeng-
ing a church because it is completely secular in operation and elastic
enough to be applied to various religious organizations.'" Another
advantage of this approach is the ease with which courts can deter-
mine whether or not it can be applied. 104 For example, when the in-
terpretation of deeds, charters, bylaws, or church constitutions would
require a civil court to resolve disputes regarding religious doctrine, it.
is easily determined that neutral principles of law cannot. be applied
to interpret the case in accordance with the First Amendment, 105 In
97 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 604; liAssErr, supra note 1, § 7:23.
98 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-05; BAssrrr, supra note 1, § 7:32.
99 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602; IlAssurr, supra note 1, § 7:32.
m° See U.S. CoNs.r. amend. 1;ft/to, 443 U,S. at 602; BAssErr, supra note 1, § 7:32 (cit-
ing Peter M. Shannon, Deference or Neutral Principles: The Dual Approach by Civil Courts to
Eccle.siasti cal Disputes, 49 l'uocEEnestGs CLSA 106 (1987)).
101 See Jones, 443 U.S, at 602; BASSUCE, supra note 1, § 7:32 (citing Peter M. Shannon,
Deference or Neutral Principles: The Dual Approach by Civil Courts to Ecclesiastical Disputes, 49
PROCEEDINGS CLSA 106 (1987)).
102 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603; liAssri -r, supra note 1, § 7:32 (citing Peter M. Shannon,
Deference or Neutral Principles: The Dual Approach by Civil Courts to Ecclesiastical Disputes, 49
PRocrItIoINGs CLSA 106 (1987)).
103 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603; BASSETE, supra note 3, § 7:32.
101 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603; IlAssurr, supra note 1, § 7:32.
103 See U.S. ConisT. amend, I; Jones, 443 U.S. at 602; 11Assurr, supra note 1, § 7:32.
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such an event, the court must still defer to authoritative ecclesiastical
bodies. 1 °6 Because the neutral principles of law approach relies exclu
sively upon objective, well-established concepts of property, trust, and
contract law, subject matter familiar to lawyers and judges, the Jones
Court concluded that civil courts, in adhering to these norms, could
avoid entanglement in religious doctrine, polity and practice.'° 7
As part of the concept of neutral principles of law, Jones also dis-
cusses severability.m The concept of severability relates to a civil
court's ability to address church property disputes through the lens of
secular trust and property law rather than defer to ecclesiastical tri-
bunals.m So long as civil courts rely on objective and well-established
concepts of law, which do not require judicial interpretation of relig-
ious doctrine, civil courts may identify the proper legal owner of
church assets without running afoul of the First Amendment."° After
Jones, civil courts have broad discretion to resolve church property
disputes by relying on secular legal principles from other areas of the
Interestingly, the Court in Jones explicitly outlined ways in which
churches can avoid having church disputes settled in civil courts. 112
The Court suggested redrafting church constitutions, charters, and
other documents to make clear, in religious terms, who controls the
property, thereby leaving civil courts no choice but to uphold church
designations. 1
 The Supreme Court indicated that through explicit
provisions, churches could define what happens to the disposition of
property for any number of given doctrinal controversies. 114 Addi-
tionally, the Supreme Court clarified that a civil court would have to
defer to a hierarchical church's tribunal's jurisdiction if the church
had property distribution policies in place and the tribunal was oper-
ating with procedural regularity." 5
For a church to shield successfully its decisions from civil adjudi-
cation, it must have documents that clearly present the procedures by
which church decisions are made and express religious justifications
1°5 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 604.
107 See id. at 603.
1°8 See id.; BASSE17, supra note 1, § 7:32.
109 SceJones, 443 U.S. at 603; BassErr, supra note 1, § 7:32.
' 10 Seelones, 443 U.S. at 603; BAssrrr, supra note 1, § 7:32.
111 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603; Brost:TT, supra note 1, § 7:32.
il4 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603; BASSUIT, supra note 1, § 7:32.
113 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 604; BASSET'', supra note 1, § 7:32.
114 &dories, 443 U.S. at 603.
115 See id.; BAssurr, supra note 1, § 7:32.
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for the sources of authority or the purposes of particular decisions. 118
In order to secure this constitutional safeguard, however, the basic
documents must demonstrate a clear self-understanding as portrayed
by the religious body:117 For the church to demonstrate its religious
self-understanding, the church must show that its religious values are
so entwined with the institution's governance that civil adjudication is
precluded." 8 In order for the church to take advantage of First
Amendment freedoms, the church must convince a civil court that
religious overtones pervade the entire property dispute, preventing
the court from severing the property dispute and applying secular
principles of law. 119
Hierarchical religious institutions (such as the Roman Catholic
and Episcopal Churches) organized as corporations sole thus have the
ability to shield property disputes from civil courts. 120 Such entities
can do so by combining religious doctrine with organizational docu-
ments that address the adjudicatiOn and resolution of such issues. 121
When church property is insulated in this manner, civil courts must
defer to the religious decision-making body in order to comply with
the First Amendment. 122 Alternatively, when a hierarchical church or-
ganized as a corporation sole has neglected to indicate in its religious
and organizational documents an intent to resolve church property
disputes internally; a civil court may adjudicate the issue without. vio-
lating the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses by applying neu-
tral principles of law and severability. 123
B. Secular Principles
Because civil courts can adjudicate some property disputes by ap-
plying secular principles of law, such as property and trust law, it. is
necessary to understand how courts apply these principles to resolve
specific issues. 124
 This Note aims to help plaintiffs prevent, retrospec-
tively or prospectively, property gifted to their local parish from being
116 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-04; EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, IR, & PHILIP C, SOREN-
SEN, ASCENDING LIABILITY IN RELIGIOUS AND OTHER NONPROFIT OttrANtzivrtoNs 99
(HOWARD GRIFFIN ED., 1984).
117 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-04; GAFFNEY & SORENSEN, supra note 116, at 99.
116 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-04; GAFFNEY & SoRENSEN, supra note 116, at 99-100.
119 See U.S. CoNst. amend. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604.
1" See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-04; IlAssri-r, supra note 1, § 7:23.
121 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-04, 606; BAssErr, supra note 1, § 7:23.
122 See U.S. CONSt. amend. I; Jones, 443 U.S. at 605; BASSE17, supra note 1, § 7:23.
123 See U.S. CONS t. amend. I; Jones, 443 U.S. at 602; BAssurr, supra note 1, § 7:32.
124 Sceptics, 443 U.S. at 603.
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transferred to the archdiocese of a hierarchical church upon suppres-
sion of the local parish. This necessitates a discussion of the doctrine
of cy pres, which allows courts to interpret a will so as to carry out the
testator's intentions expressed therein.I 25
When a testator leaves property in trust for charitable purposes,
the trust does not necessarily fail because the testator has failed to
state the particular charitable purpose to which the property is to be
applied.'" The trust fails, however, when the testator manifests an in-
tention that the property is only to be used for a particular charitable
purpose, yet fails to manifest properly that specific charitable in ten-
tion. 127 When a testator has not manifested an intention to devote
property to charitable purposes generally, but has manifested an in-
tention to devote it to a particular charitable purpose, the intended
charitable trust fails if the particular charitable purpose cannot be
accomplished. 128
For example, if a testator left property in trust for his or her local
parish stating that he or she intended the property to benefit anybody
interested in the teachings of Catholicism generally?, the trust would
not fail because the testator did not indicate a specific use for the
property."9 The gift survives because the testator stated a general in-
tent to benefit religion and did not condition the gift upon a particu-
lar use only.'" This is not the case, however, where a testator
specifically leaves property to benefit his or her local parish."' In the
latter case, the testator has clearly manifested a specific intent—to
benefit the local parish—limiting the scope of the charitable purpose,
but failing to indicate the exact condition. Because the testator did
not express a general intent to promote religion, but did express a
specific intent to benefit his or her local parish, the gift must fail be-
cause of a lack of specification regarding the charitable purpose." 2
125 See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 441 (1970).
126 see Evans, 396 U.S. at 441; AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTF & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCIIER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS g 395 (4th ed. 1989).
127 See SCO • I' & FRATCIIER, supra note 126, § 395.
128 See Evans, 396 U.S. at 441; Scull . & FRATCIIER, supra note 126. § 395.
' 29 See Evans, 396 U.S. at 440. The hypotheticals are the Author's creation.
150 See id.
' 3 ' See id. at 441.
132 See id.
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1. Cy Pres
In situations where it becomes impossible or impractical to carry
out the testator's wishes, cy pres can be used to modify the testator's
intention and achieve results that most closely resemble the testator's
intentions.'" Cy pres is an equitable doctrine that allows courts to
modify a testator's gift to mirror what the testator would have wanted
when it becomes impossible to carry out the testator's exact provi-
sion."4 Although a lack of specific charitable purpose may cause a gift
to fail, courts may apply the doctrine of cy pres when attempting to
save a charitable trust.' Thus, the central analysis in a case where cy
pres is applicable concerns the testator's intent, which is a question of
fact.'" Courts do not apply cy pres in every case when a testator's
wishes cannot be successfully fulfilled.' 37 For instance, in some situa-
tions, the testator had only one particular purpose in mind, and no
expressed general charitable intent." 8 In such cases, it is impossible to
accomplish the particular purpose, leaving courts to presume that the
testator would have preferred the trust to fail entirely, causing the as-
sets to revert to the testator's heirs.'"
When the testator includes contingency provisions in case the
testator's intent cannot be carried out, those provisions are control-
ling. 140 When the testator does not, however, include any contingency
language, courts must determine whether the gift fails entirely or
whether the doctrine of cy pres should be applied.' 41 Courts have held
that cy pres is inapplicable when a testator clearly intended the prop-
erty to be put to a particular use or for the benefit of a particular or-
ganization that has since dissolved. In such instances, the property
should revert to the testator's estate. 142 If a testator leaves property in
trust, however, for a particular charitable purpose that is incapable of
133 See id. at 440.
134 See Evans, 396 U.S. at 440.
135 See id.; Obermeyer v. Bank of Am., 140 S.W.3d 18, 23 (Mo. 2004). While cy pres was
originally used to save gifts in trust, it has been extended and applied to absolute gifts to
charitable corporations or other organizations. See Obertneyer; 140 S.W.3d at 23 (citing
Ceuta: T	 TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 431, 105 (2d ed. 1991)); Scorr & FRATCDER,
supra note 126, § 399.
1 " See Obeineyet; 140 S.W.3d at 22.
I " See Evans, 396 U.S. at 441.
138 See id.
130
 See id. at 444.
140 See id.; Sco'rr FRATtli IER, supra note 126, § 399.2.
141 See Evans, 396 U.S. at 440.
142 See id. at 444.
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being executed, the trust will not fail if the testator demonstrated a
broad, general intention to devote the property to charitable pur-
poses. 143
 In such a case, the court will utilize cy pres to dispose of the
property in line with the testator's ascertained intention.'"
For example, if a testator left money in trust to a local parish
which was suppressed shortly after the testator's death, a court could
determine that the testator possessed a general intention to devote
the property to charitable purposes, and therefore provide the money
to a successor parish."5 The other possible outcome is that the court
may assume the testator wanted to benefit the broader archdiocese in
the event of a suppression of the testator's local parish." 6 If the court
determines, however, that the testator only wanted the money to go to
the local parish, then upon its suppression, and in the absence of a
more general intent to promote religion, the gift must fail and the
money must revert to the testator's estate. 147
2. Ambiguities and Extrinsic Evidence
Other secular tools that courts apply when analyzing church
property disputes include the doctrines of judicial construction and
interpretation of wills." 8 The fundamental legal principles of judicial
construction and interpretation of wills are vital when it comes to in-
143 See id. at 441; Scorr & FRATcliER, supra note 126, § 399.2.
144 See Evans, 396 U.S. at 941.
145 See Obermeyer; 140 S.W.3d at 26 (determining where money left by testator should go
after the original recipient, the Dental Alumni Development Fund, ceased to exist upon
the closure of Washington University Dental School).
"6 See id. This hypothetical is analogous to the court's decision in Obernayer u Bank of
America to use cy pres and give the money to Washington University generally, despite the
fact that the conditional gift failed when the dental school closed and the specific Dental
Fund ceased to exist. See id. The decision to give the money to Washington University
hinged upon the court's finding that the testator possessed general, rather than specific,
charitable intent despite contrary language indicating his intent to benefit the Dental
Fund specifically. See id. This situation, however, is distinguishable from the one proposed
in this Note regarding a testator's gift to their local parish for two reasons. First, the de-
ceased in Obermeyer made unrestricted donations throughout his life to Washington Uni-
versity generally without any conditions regarding the dental school or the Dental Fund.
Sec id. Second, the remainder of his estate was left to Washington University generally—a
clear intention to benefit more than just the dental school. Sec id. Thus, the court's ability
to find general intent in the face of narrowly tailored language lies in the court's analysis
of the testator's intent as determined from a lifetime of giving to the University. See id.
"7 See Evans, 396 U.S. at 444 (holding that because testator gifted and demonstrated
specific intent of leaving public park to white people only, testator would rather have gift
fail and revert to his heirs than be a racially integrated park).
148 See id. at 440; Oberrneyer, 140 S.W.3d at 25-26; GEoRnE W. Tuomrsoil, CONS'IRUC-
TION AND INTERPRETATION OF WILLS § 83 (1928).
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terpreting testamentary documents. 149 In cases where the testator's
intent is clear and can be inferred from the will itself, but the testator
has omitted certain words necessary to express fully his intention,
courts will supply the necessary words by implication to bring about
the result the testator intended.'"
For example, if a testator bequeathed money to the local parish,
conditioned on the fact that the parish remain in existence, courts
may infer that, should the parish be suppressed, the testator intended
the gift to revert back to the testator's heirs based on the will itself.'"
Under these circumstances, a court will supply the missing lan-
guage.'" Courts may not read language into a will, however, unless
the court finds that the testator's intentions are clearly inferable from
the will itself, although perhaps not appropriately expressed)"
When applying a provision in the testator's will to actual circum-
stances, events often occur after the testator's death that call into
question the testator's intent.'" In cases where the testator's intent
cannot clearly be ascertained from the content of the will, a court may
consider additional facts and circumstances existing at the time of the
will's execution to ascertain the testator's intent.'" The court should
tin ts step into the shoes of the testator and consider the circumstances
influencing the testator when the will was executed) 56
When circumstances change after a testator's death, ambiguities
often result)" There are two kinds of ambiguities—patent and la-
tent)58 A patent ambiguity is one that appears on the face of the will
itself, preventing a court from interpreting the testator's intent)" A
latent ambiguity, in contrast, arises out of a document that is compre-
hensible on its face, but becomes unclear when its terms are applied
149 See Evans, 396 U.S. at 440; Obermeyen 140 S.W.3d at 25-26; THomesoN, supra note
148, § 83.
15° See Baker-Boyer Nat'l Bank v. Henricksen, 46 F. Supp. 831, 836 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
n om r so tkr , supra note 148, § 83.
151 This is the Author's own hypothetical.
152 Sec Henricksen, 46 F. Supp. at 836; THOMPSON, supra note 148, § 83.
155 See Henricksen, 46 F. Stipp. at 834; THolvirsoN, supra note 148, § 83.
154 Sec Obermeyen 140 S.W.3d at 21; Tit omPSON, supra note 148, § 217.
155 Sec Obermeyen 140 S.W.3d at 26; THOMPSON, supra note 148, § 217.
156 See EVallS, 396 U.S. at 441; Thom psoN, supra note 148, § 217.
157 See Evans, 396 U.S. at 437; Obernreyn 140 S.W.3d at 22; THomrsoN, supra note 148,
§327.
155 See Bradley v. Wash., Alexandria & Georgetown Steam-Packet Co„ 38 U.S. 89, 97
(1839); THomi n soN, supra note 148, § 327.
155 See Bradley, 38 U.S. at 97; THoritrson, supra note 148, § 327.
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to specific circumstances. 160 Most courts hold that extrinsic evidence
cannot be introduced to resolve patent ambiguities. 161 In contrast, for
latent ambiguities where the will itself is free from defect, extrinsic
evidence can be introduced to clarify the testator's intent. 162
Examples of extrinsic evidence that the court should lake into
consideration when clarifying the testator's intent include the testa-
tor's thought habits, the testator's relationship to, or associations with,
the bounty, and the testator's motives. 163 Even though the testator's
intention must be found in the will, courts are able to infer the mean-
ing of the words in the will by taking into account various circum-
stances that affected and motivated the testator at the time of execu-
tion.'" Although extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances
cannot be used to assert an intention differing from that expressed in
the will, extrinsic evidence is properly used as an aid in proving the
correct understanding of the will's langttage. 165
Interpreting and applying extrinsic evidence is particularly rele-
vant to the successful application of cy pres. 166 When a testator's will
indicates an exact duty to be performed, and it then becomes impos-
sible to perform that duty, the doctrine of cy pres is used to accom-
plish the testator's intent as best as possible. 167 There is often confu-
sion and controversy in testamentary gifts to religious or charitable
organizations, and for that reason, when applying the doctrine of cy
pres to religious purposes, the general rule is to apply extrinsic facts
and circumstances so as to give effect to the testator's intent. 168 Be-
cause it is critical to accomplishing the testator's ultimate purpose,
interpreting testamentary documents requires discerning the testa-
tor's intent—that is, what the testator would have wanted if aware that
the provision could not be carried out.' 69 Thus, a court should con-
160 See Bradley, 38 U.S. at 97; Titorui.soN, supra note 148, § 327.
161 See Bradley, 38 U.S. at 97; TitomrsoN, supra note 148, § 327. Extrinsic evidence is in-
formation from outside the will which is used to help construe the true intent of the testa-
tor. See JESSE LURED/MIER & STANLEY NIJOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 420 (6th
ed. 2000).
162 See Bradley, 38 U.S. at 97; TilomPSON, supra note 148, § 327.
163 See Obernieyer; 140 S.W.3d at 26; TuomPsoN, supra note 148, § 217.
164 See Oberrneyel; 140 S.W.3d at 26; TnomPSON, supra note 148, § 217.
165 See Oberrneyel; 140 S,W.3d at 26; THOMPSON, supra note 148, § 217.
166 See Oberrneyeg 140 S.W.3d at 26; TuomPstm, supra note 148, § 217. •
167 See Evans, 396 U.S. at 440; THOMPSON, supra note 148, § 142.
168 Sec Obermeye4 140 S.W.3d at 23; TuomPsort, supra note 148, § 144.
169 See Obernityeg 140 S.W.3d at 25.
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sider all the relevant surrounding circumstances, as embodied by ex-
trinsic evidence, in determining the testator's inten1. 1 "
IV. ANALYSIS: RESOLVING CHURCH PROPERTY DISPUTES THROUGH
APPLICATION OF NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES
The application of neutral principles is the accepted method for
determining which faction involved in a church schism is the rightful
owner of church property."' This Note argues that this approach
should be extended to situations involving gifts by individuals to
churches, thereby preserving testator intent and preventing an arch-
diocese or similar body from claiming gifted property. In deciding
which faction is the true representative of a hierarchical church, a
judgment often requires ecclesiastical determinations, something a
civil court cannot make. 172 The Supreme Court, however, has stated
that where church bodies have not created their own guidelines for
property dispute resolutions, states are free to so do, so long as the
investigation is free from religious determinations. 1 " Therefore, in
cases involving individuals, rather than factions, where no or inade-
quate church guidelines exist for property dispute resolutions, neutral
principles should apply. 174 This Note also offers practical advice for
donors who are retroactively trying to regain control of their property
and for donors who prospectively want to guarantee their gifts are
used according to their specific wishes.
A. Defense of Neutral Principles and Support for Its Extension,
1. The Policy Justification for Applying Neutral Principles in Intra-
Church Disputes and for Extending It
The Supreme Court has given civil courts the ability to use neu-
tral principles of law while steering clear of religious controversy in
the context of determining which church faction is entitled to the use
and control of church property.'" There are inherently religious
overtones in determining which church faction actually controls the
church in contrast to the lack of any religious overtones in determin-
170 Sec id. at 26.
171 Sec Watson vjones, 80 U.S. 679, 703 (1872).
172 Secjones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 607 (1979).
172 See id. at 602.
174 See id.
175 See Watson, 80 U.S. at 725.
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big whether a particular gift made by a testator's will should fail. 176
Analysis regarding who is entitled to use and enjoy church property in
an infra-church dispute relies mostly upon the analysis of relevant
church documents, which are used to decide which faction actually
represents the church. In contrast, a determination of whether a
church should he allowed to keep a bequest relies more heavily upon
the law of wills and trusts."7
The policy reason for enforcing the neutral principles of legal
analysis in intra-church disputes—that is, the state's interest in peace-
ful resolution of property disputes—applies even more forcefully to
settling disputes between a religious body and an individual. 178 This is
because of the drastic reduction of religious inquiries required in a
property dispute."9 In 1979, in Jones v. Wolf; the Supreme Court indi-
cated that states have a legitimate interest in providing a civil forum
for the peaceful resolution of church property disputes while being
mindful of resolving such disputes outside the auspices of religious
doctrine and practice.'" The Supreme Court thus required deference
when religious institutions have already designated that property dis-
putes are to be resolved within the ecclesiastical body, but explicitly
stated that states may otherwise adopt various approaches to resolving
these property disputes."' Applied to cases where gifts have been
made, where no religious inquiries are necessary, neutral principles
should apply.t 8"
2. Applying Neutral Principles Beyond Intra-Church Disputes
Opponents of the neutral principles approach believe that it is
inappropriate to inquire into the proper ownership of property gifted
to a soon-to-be suppressed local parish.'" This school of thought views
the decision to suppress a parish as an internal church decision, in-
herently religious in nature.' 81
176 See Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 440 (1970); Watson, 80 U.S. at 706.
177 See Evans, 396 U.S. at 439; Watson, 80 U.S. at 706.
178 See Watson, 80 U.S. at 726; Akoury v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, 18
Mass. L. Rptr. 271, 272 (Mass. Super. 2004).
179 See Evans, 396 U.S. at 439; Watson, 80 U.S. at 706.
18° &clones, 443 U.S. at 602.
181 See id.
182
 See Watson, 80 U.S. at 726; Akoury, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. at 272.
ta.' Sec Altatiry, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. at 272.
184 See id.
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In Akoury v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, the plaintiffs—
members of a local parish that was part of the Roman Catholic
Church—attempted to enjoin the Archbishop of Boston from liqui-
dating, transferring, and conveying to the office of the Archbishop,
property allegedly held in trust for the benefit of the local parish. 185
In focusing on the important role that the local parish played in the
plaintiffs' lives as a place to celebrate life and death, the Massachu-
setts Superior Court viewed the plaintiffs' claim as an attempt to pre-
vent parish suppression. 186 Because the court viewed this suit as an
attempt to halt suppression, it focused on the religious nature of the
decision to close a parish. 187 The court concluded that closing a par-
ish is a matter best left to the Archbishop.' The Superior Court also
indicated that because the Roman Catholic Church is hierarchical in
structure and a corporation sole, the parish assets were held in cus-
tody for the benefit of the Archdiocese by its agent, the pastor of the
local parish. 189
The Akoury court's holding—that. the decision to close a parish is
inherently religions—appears at first to frustrate a plaintiff's attempt
to regain control of conditionally gifted property.'" This holding,
however, is not applicable to the situations this Note considers, which
involve testators who want to prevent an archdiocese from claiming
their property. 191
For one, in Akoury, the court framed the legal issue in terms of
the plaintiffs trying to prevent parish suppression, which is an inher-
ently religious issue that civil courts cannot hear. 192 The legal issue
present in the case of a plaintiff who gifts property to their local par-
ish for its use only is not a religious question touching suppression of
the congregation in the first place.' 93 Rather, the legal issue is the
purely secular question of who has title to the property when the
beneficiary of the gift ceases to exist as was required, either expressly
or implicitly, in the gift provision itself, 194
154 See id. at 271.
106 See id.
lir Sec id. at 272.
1138 See Akou ry, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. at 272.
log See id.
Igo See id.
191 Sec id.
192 See id.
193 See Akoury, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. at 272.
194 See Jones, 493 U.S. at 603-04.
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Additionally, there is an unspoken issue that pervades the Akoury
case which distinguishes Akoury from cases involving gifted prop-
erty. 195 Nowhere in Akoury is it indicated that the plaintiffs had any
interest in the disputed property aside from their previous use of it.'"
In other words, potential plaintiffs have a truly legitimate interest in
property they owned and conditionally gifted to the local parish,
whereas the Akoury plaintiffs merely wanted to keep the property
which they had become accustomed to using. 197
 For this reason, their
attempt to frame the dispute as one over property failed.'"
There is thus a fundamental difference between the plaintiffs in
Akoury and those who are attempting to regain control over property
gifted to a church. 199 Unlike the plaintiffs in Akoury who challenged
the Archdiocese's decision to suppress their local parish and tried to
retain control over property that possibly did not belong to them,
plaintiffs who are trying to regain control over property that is right-
fully theirs, rather than challenging suppression, do not present a le-
gal question that is religious in nature. 200 Rather, they present a clear
case for the application of neutral principles of the law of property,
wills, and trusts. 2° 1
B. Preventing the Archdiocese from Claiming Gifted Property
Because of the corporate structure of hierarchical churches and
the religious freedoms guaranteed under the First Amendment of the
Constitution, plaintiffs have limited room to maneuver when it comes
to preventing the archdiocese from claiming gifted property upon
suppression of their local parish. 202 There is an inherent tension that
exists between what a hierarchical church can do with certain prop-
erty and the legal significance of interpreting the testator's intent in
gifting that same property. 20
195 See Akoury, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. at 272.
195 See id. at 271-72.
197 See id.
198 See id. at 272.
199 See id.
200 See Akoury, 18 Mass. L. Rptr. at 272.
2° 1 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603.
202 See U.S. CONST. amend. I; BASSETI; supra note 1, § 3:2.
203 Compare Linss•rr, supra note 1, § 3:2 (stating that hierarchical institutions have the
ability under the First Amendment to insulate decisions regarding property disputes by
intertwining dispute-solving mechanisms with religious polity), with TimmrsoN, supra note
148, § 83 (stating that, when determining the proper disposition of a testator's property,
the testator's intent is the controlling authority).
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Unfortunately for plaintiffs, where the hierarchical church has
clearly chosen to designate in its religious charters, incorporation
documents, and bylaws the method by which all property disputes are
handled by the ecclesiastical tribunal, civil courts will probably not be
able to adjudicate the matter by applying neutral principles of law. 204
The Supreme Court has indicated that when religious institutions so
commingle their religious doctrine with dispute-solving mechanisms, it
would be a violation of the First Amendment for any civil court to at-
tempt to alter the ecclesiastical tribunal's resolution of the dispute. 205
It. appears that challenges to the disposition of gifts already made
to soon-to-be suppressed local parishes will be limited to those situa-
tions where the hierarchical church has not clearly indicated in its
relevant documents the manner in which property disputes are to be
adjudicated. 206 In these cases, religion is not so intertwined with the
disposition of the disputed property so as to prevent a civil court from
applying neutral principles of law.207 It is within these confines that
plaintiffs have the ability to argue the legal importance of intent so as
to prevent the property from going to the archdiocese. 208
Under neutral principles of law, a civil court can turn to legal
concepts with which it is familiar, mainly property, trusts, and wills. 209
Because the testator's intent is the single-most important determina-
tion of disposal of gifted property, plaintiffs should focus their argu-
ments here. 21° Donors who intend to benefit their local parish or a
successor parish but not the archdiocese must know what to do both
prospectively and retrospectively to ensure they succeed in accom-
plishing their goals.
I. Prospective Protection of Donor's Intent
Although the doctrine of cy pres can be applied to a will to achieve
results similar to those that the testator intended, use of unambiguous
language is preferred. 211 In order to avoid a situation in which a court
finds broad charitable intent such that upon the suppression of a local
parish the court assumes the testator would have wanted the bequest to
2" Sec Watson, 80 U.S. at 733; BAssE•r, supra note 1, § 3:2.
205 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. I; Watson, 80 U.S. at 733; BAssErr, supra note 1, § 3:2.
204 Seejones, 443 U.S. at 603; BAssErr, supra note 1, § 7:32.
202 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-04; BASS rrr, supra note I, § 7:32.
208 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-04; BAssErr, supra note 1, § 7:32.
209 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 603-04; BAssE•r, supra note 1, § 7:32.
210 See Evans, 396 U.S. at 442.
211 See id. at 440-41.
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transfer to the archdiocese or similar body, it is necessary that the testa-
tor indicate where the property is and is not to go.212
Potential testators seeking to benefit simultaneously a local parish
and prevent the transfer of money to the archdiocese must be explicit
in any gift provision. 215 If a general charitable intent is ascertained in
a gift provision to a local parish such that a court can apply the doc-
trine of cy pres, the testator must indicate that in the event of the par-
ish's suppression, the testator's intent is limited to the benefit of a
successor parish, not the archdiocese or similar body. 214 Testators
must accordingly carefully limit the extent of their intended generos-
ity.2 t 5 Otherwise, a finding of general intent to promote religion
might lead a court to award erroneously the money to the archdio-
cese in the absence of the testator's clear intention not to do so. 216
2. Retrospective Protection of Donor's Intent
When a testator leaves money to a local parish that is later sup-
pressed, it is proper for a court to use extrinsic evidence in order to
prove under the circumstances that the testator would either have: (1)
wanted the money to go to a successor parish; (2) wanted the money to
revert to the testator's heirs; or (3) not have wanted the money to go to
the archdiocese. 217 In any of these three situations, the use of extrinsic
evidence does not infuse contradictory intention into the testator's will
different from that expressed by the document, but rather clarifies dis-
persal of the gift in the case of a suppressed parish. 218
If a gift has already been made to a soon-to-be suppressed local
parish and the archdiocese claims a right to the property, the ques-
212 See Obermeyer v. Bank of Am., 140 S.W.3d 18,26 (Mo. 2004).
213 Compare Evans, 396 U.S. at 441-42 (holding that the testator left such detailed in-
structions in his will regarding the limits of his charitable purpose that he would prefer the
gift to fail than be used otherwise), with Obentrer, 190 S.W.3d at 26 (holding that the testa-
tor's intent was not specific enough to require the gift to fail upon the recipient's dissolu-
tion).
214 See Evans, 396 U.S. at 441; Obertneym; 190 S.W.3d at 26.
213
 See Obcrmeyei; 140 S.W.3d at 26.
216
 Compare Evans, 396 U.S. at 441-42 (holding that where the testator clearly mani-
fested a specific intent that could not be fulfilled, the gift must fail), with Obermeyer: 140
S.W.3d at 26 (holding that a testator's stated intent to gift money to a university's dental
fund was not limiting and specific enough to prevent the court from giving the money to
the University as a whole).
217 See supra notes 148-70 and accompanying text. This is a hypothetical situation, the
content of which is supported by the previous discussion of the proper use of extrinsic
evidence.
213
 See Ober-Purr; 140 S.W.3d at 26.
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Lion becomes how to protect retrospectively the donor's intent. If the
will does not expressly state what is to happen to the property upon
suppression, a court may find the presence of a latent ambiguity. 219 A
latent ambiguity is an ambiguity that arises not from a flaw in the will
itself, but from changed external circumstances since the time the will
was executed.22° In the case of latent ambiguities, courts often look to
extrinsic evidence, such as the testator's motivations, so that it can
step into the testator's shoes and modify the will accordingly. 221
Although extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances can-
not be used to assert an intention different from that expressed in the
will, it is properly used as an aid in proving the correct understanding
of the utilized language. 222 Plaintiffs in this position must introduce
evidence relating to the testator's motivation in making the disposi-
tion and the relationship between the testator and the beneficiary of
the bounty, so as to leave no doubt that the testator's true intent was
to benefit the local parish and not to promote religion generally. 223
CONCLUSION
Religious institutions such as the Roman Catholic Church that
are hierarchical in structure and organized as corporations sole are
powerful entities. Because the First Amendment mandates separation
of church and state, churches have the ability to insulate the decisions
made by their adjudicative bodies in resolving property disputes.
Churches can carefully craft their religious documents in a way that
entangles church polity with ordinary property disputes, requiring
civil courts to defer to ecclesiastical tribunals in compliance with the
Constitution.
In situations where hierarchical churches have neglected to make
religious documents part of the adjudicative process, however, or in
cases where such church bodies have not shown an entwined relation-
ship between property disputes and religious polity, civil courts can
adjudicate church property disputes by applying neutral principles of
law. In applying neutral principles of law, courts will refer to areas of
law with which lawyers and judges are familiar. By referring to the law
of property, trusts, and wills, courts analyze a testator's gift provisions
219 See Bradley v. Wash., Alexandria & Georgetown Steam-Packet Co., 38 U.S. 89, 97
(1839): THOMPSON, supra note 148, § 327.
229 See Bmdley, 38 U.S. at 97; TERMIPSON, supra note 148, § 327.
221 See Bradley. 38 U.S. at 97; Tiicisil'SON, supra note 148, § 217.
222 See Bradley, 38 U.S. at 97; TitumrsoN, supra note 148, § 217.
222 See Bradley, 38 U.S. at 97; MOM l'SON, supra note 148, § 217.
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to determine the testator's intent when a particular provision is inca-
pable of being satisfied.
The suppression of local parishes has brought the tension be-
tween a religious institution's autonomy and the need to satisfy a tes-
tator's intent to the public eye. There is limited room for potential
plaintiffs to maneuver when it comes to preventing the archdiocese of
a hierarchical church from capturing a local parish's assets when the
hierarchical church has explicitly provided for the manner in which it
will resolve property disputes. Where these provisions are lacking,
however, plaintiffs seeking to control the disposition of property ret-
rospectively must rely on the doctrine of cy pres and the admission of
extrinsic evidence to clarify any latent ambiguities regarding a testa-
tor's intended beneficiaries. Those looking to control the disposition
of property prospectively must explain the limited terms upon which
the gift is being made, designate who are and are not the beneficiaries
of the gift, and provide for the reversion of the gift to the testator's
heirs should circumstances arise such that the testator's intent is frus-
trated.
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